The Temporal Nature of National Thinking - The Turkish Cypriot Case

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Abstract

Contemporary approaches within identity studies assume conceptualizations of national thinking in flux. From this standpoint, the study sets forth to explain the temporal nature of national thinking and related conceptualizations of “self” and “other”. It initially deals with reflections of various fields of inquiry into the logic of temporality, and then seeks to elaborate this logic by analysing the case of Cyprus, the conflictual phase between the north and south, from the mindset of the Turkish Cypriot community. The fact that the national thinking has altered across the changing conditions in Northern Cyprus leads the author to rely on revealing arguments of the political theory that heed the instrumental and temporal character of “self-other” conceptualizations.

Key Words: Logic of temporality, national thinking, Turkish Cypriot community, Annan plan referendum

Milli Düşünmenin Zamansal Doğası - Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu Örneği

Özet


Anahtar Kelimeler: Zamansal yaklaşımı, ulusal düşünce, Kıbrıs Türk Toplumu, Annan Planı referandumu

1 In contemporary approaches to identity studies, it is of obvious importance to render conceptualizations in flux. The study puts this forth, by assuming that temporality is also in force in relation to national thinking and related conceptualizations of “self” and “other” in international relations. It thus sets to fulfil a dynamic approach to understand the construction of national thinking to be employed in one case, by reflecting upon the temporal dimension under the influence of norms and interests.

The theoretical grasp is outlined here as a two-fold view. The first is that individual and societal reasoning conceptualizes the “self” and “other” on a temporal and co-existential manner. This view comes into airing with various approaches in the field of philosophy and social anthropology, reflecting the existentialist and banal natures of individual and societal changes. The second view is that conceptualizations in national thinking take place on a

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8 The philosophical and social-anthropological casts vary on the issue of temporality. The existentialist view initiates a debate between the lines of ontological-epistemological constructions. See Odysseos, Louizia, The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2007. The approach of banal nationalism from the social anthropology, however, highlights the epistemology of the national “self” and “other” constructed in society, through an elite-led instrumentalist mechanism. See, Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism, Sage Publications, London 1995.
dynamic ground of human reasoning that is apt to change between interests and norms. The study in this course does not aim at differentiating interests and norms; it does, rather, subsume all, in the complex set of social codes. Yet a suggestive logic formulates the human articulation within the phase of self-criticism, or “logic of appropriateness”, among the interest and norm-ridden net of social codes. The standpoint is thus that conceptualizations over self-other dichotomy are forged in a temporal sense, upon the self-critical reasoning. The temporality is what the study lays its ultimate emphasis on: in the nature of international relations and various phases of social actions regarding conflict and rapprochement, national thinking with senses of belonging and othering is apt to change in time. It hence seeks to orient this approach according to the case of Cyprus, the conflictual phase between the north and south, from the mindset of the Turkish Cypriot community and national thinking over conceptualizing their “self” and “other”.

The Logic of Temporality

The temporal nature of human relations sets an important standpoint for various spheres of inquiry. Introducing this nature to the academic agenda on the theory of co-existential relations between being and the outer world, the concept “other”, for instance, has mostly remained in the foreground of identity studies. Giving this term, however, requires an overview of the whole social event, namely reflecting the co-existential and temporal relationship between the “self” and “other”, within the national thinking of society. This emphasis leads to further paradigm shifts in elaborating social phenomena, from “being” considered a rational and self-contained entity to transitional, post-structural reflections among actors of social life.

Conceptualizing the “self” thus renders, in modern studies, accounting the functional logic and subjectivity of the being essential. This account differs from structural approaches to the essence of being hinged on rationality. For one instance, the intellectual premises of Hobbesian thinking legitimize various approaches through an initial grasp on state with unconditional rationality. In modern studies, however, “statehood” finds its way within a set of governors while total rationality is replaced with optimism. The optimism of statesmen, one step further through ontological approaches, takes shape in an environment of social codes shared within society. Social actors are thus involved in inter-subjective reflection of being in

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2 This view finds place in approaches of social constructivism, as well as the study of ethics and morality. More conventional approaches within the constructivist turn elaborate the logic of appropriateness a context-driven mode of decision between various factors in international relations. In the sense of human agent, individual action is similarly linked to a given situation, ascribed identities and norms. Sending, Ole, Jacob, “Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the ‘Logic of Appropriateness’ and its use in Constructivist Theory”, European Journal of International Relations, vol.8, 2002, p. 447. From the study of ethics, Walzer holds a similar view in that human articulation is constructed on the basis of interests, identities and values while an accurate level of expression is reached through self-criticism under the influence of those factors. Walzer, Michael, Thick and Thin: The Moral Philosophy at Home and Abroad, University of Notre Dame Press, London 1994, pp.84-91.


4 Odyssseos, ibid, pp.: 2-3.

time; they decide and express by the impulse of moment lived with the “others”, through
which social groups and categories are constituted. In a nutshell, “coexistence is post-
onontological for IR” 6, since the self-critical standing of social actors in a social realm of
interests and beliefs generates these conceptualizations.

Depending on this course, progressive works within the field of international relations
have linked the temporality of being to the explanation of social phenomena. In her usefully
detailed work, Louiza Odysseos links the issue of coexistence as a temporal event to the
existentialist cast of Martin Heidegger, on the logic of coexistence and “dasein”. 7 The
Heideggerian cut in philosophy comes into view on events within the international relations
environment through the emphasis upon temporality and now-sequences within the
ontological phases of “self”. One thus claims that a practical self-other conceptualization to
understand any inter-communal debate is prominent within the premises of the logic of
temporality.

The temporal logic of self-criticism can be brought into focus here, considering the
importance of reflecting the banal nature of social relations, as well as a dynamic logic
inherited upon temporal dimension of self-other coexistence in society. The study involves a
brief glance at excerpts of this logic from the inheritance of philosophical and social-
anthropological spheres of inquiry. The existentialist cut on temporal essence of being is one
among such concepts, since scholars led by Martin Heidegger put “self” and “other”
conceptualizations beyond self-fulfilling existences, with a meaning associated to the things
of outer environment in accordance and their entire significance with each other. 8 Therefore, put
to great use for this study, being is a sequence of appropriate reasoning of this coexistence
with outer space. 9 The overlooked phases of “being”, in this way points at various, successive
eras of the “self” through its temporal form of existence. The pre-Heideggerian mainstream
searches the essence of being outside its presence, while Heidegger has an intention to imply
the relational processes in time, between being and outer space. Self-other coexistence is thus
reached in “dasein”, as a “being here” or a “being there” phase without a mediator. 10 It is a
metaphor, a process of structuring not isolated but engaged in ontological relationship with the
outer world. Within this realm, “others” are re-formed to constituting elements within
“dasein”’s everyday praxis.

In a nutshell, “dasein” constitutes shared social practices, which are conditional with
“dasein” itself. Heidegger keeps his focus on the temporality of “dasein” in everyday life,
through which being finds its presence in time. It is a mode of comprehending what “I am”
and “who I am not”, a mode of describing the being in accordance with “what is not that
being”, through temporal conditions. The very point is that “dasein” is a process of self-
fulfilling. 11 Time in this regard projects the continuation of now-sequence while the meaning of
“now” is already in the past, within a process through which reasoning remains reliable

6 Odysseos, ibid, pp.24.
7 Odysseos puts forward this Heideggerian coexistence with the simplified meaning of “dasein”, “being there is
being with”, ibid, p.72.
Heidegger finds roots of this view of object-environment relationship in Husserlian argumentation.
11 For Heidegger, “dasein” it is the mode of time which is “the horizon for all understanding of the to-be and for
any way of interpreting it” Heidegger, ibid, p.39.
experience. What hence remains is a focus on time, a transcendental source of presentation, reproduction and anticipation on the image of being and “other”, through the related “now-sequence”, a process reflecting instant moments of coexistence. The logic of temporality then re-capitalizes the being, from the self-outside world dualism to a co-existential process of re-construction. This process is introduced between the self and the first or second order images categorized in tandem with their functional relevance with the being. Heidegger adds that the categorical determinations of “dasein” are temporal modalities of what the use of “other” is, or how being it is. This rank of otherness could offer a suggestive logic for international relations too; any phenomenon pertinent to inter-group defiance, debate or conflict enters into a new form characterized by temporality and practicality. In other words, the sorts of conceptualizations changing in time in international relations between at least two factions reflect the novel and temporal phases of re-construction, in relation to use or misuse of conditions before the latest moment of their coexistence.

Is this co-existential linkage amoral? To some scholars ontological account on self-other dichotomy lacks an ethical spirit. Emmanuel Levinas, being a leading scholar of such a critical standing, reviews this logic through which being is constructed with unethical, over-earthly and non-humanitarian idioms. For him, limited being and otherness to a fixed ontology could yield to an unethical demonization of the other. His counter argument rather takes the self-other coexistence within the premises of ethical responsibility. Denying self-other dualism based on anxiety and violence, he asserts dialogue and thereby a temporal level in between. He suggests a self-other dialogue within the spheres of metaphysics, which has no struggle for competence, space or rights, but mutual acknowledgement through the presence of a third ethical part. Yet this argument keeps bearing a focus on temporality of the coexistence, while at the same time apart from the contemporary philosophy that leads to a given character of “self” to dominate the “other”. The level of dialogue and othering in solace of a violence-free relationship leads to a new conceptualization of “otherness”, in this regard, a rival rather than an enemy that is a self-oriented and self-constituted personalization. For Jacques Derrida, for instance, there is no circumstantial or structured, but always contingent logos in self-description of being that constructs its location vis à vis the principle of “difference”. It is a sort of alterity, he puts on “self” in relation to the “other”, a sense of temporality that is hinged not necessarily on any different characteristic from the “other”, but

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12 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge 1998, p.228. These instruments of “sense”, “imagination” and “thought” assume phases associated with each mode of time; that is, we sense in a while, we imagine and embody this within a paradigm as a social code. Heidegger, in virtue with Kant, sketches a similar process with imagination as presentation, reproduction and anticipation.

13 Heidegger, ibid, p.181.


16 Ibid, p. 189.


18 Ibid, p. 54.
on the assumption that the being is different itself.\textsuperscript{19} Hence, Derrida’s deconstruction of being involves various expressions of coexistence on the level of \textit{differ\`{e}nce}. He discusses this, in his book suggestively entitled “Others Heading”, that the image of “other” is a sort of conceptualization that is “self”-reflected. Depending on various examples that Derrida made relevant with his life, some variations on the “other shores” of Mediterranean and Judaism are oriented to the cases of unfamiliarity of the being with the “other”.\textsuperscript{20} The logic of temporality within this cut confines epistemologies reflected from co-existential and temporal relationship between the “self and “other”\textsuperscript{21}.

To summarize these philosophical reflections, the argument does not here lead to the “self” and “other” as given and distant entities, nor does it render timeless conceptualizations. It is rather framed to be a reflection of seeking a dynamic approach applicable in cases of international relations upon co-existentialist and banal natures of individual and societal articulations, under the influence of norms and interests. The above arguments briefly mentioned, this study argues, offer assumptions on the temporal and co-existential essence of such conceptualisations. From this point of view, and considering this sort of reasoning on the basis of society, an already given logic from the field of banal nationalism has expressed similar grasps on the temporal level of conceptualizations in everyday life.

The approach of banal nationalism is about national thinking and its instrumental construction, rather than detailed “self-other” conceptualizations. It is formed on the continuity of nation and nationalism: the level of nationalism alters, but it never totally disappears. National symbols are instrumentally consumed and adopted into the daily life by the state apparatus in order to keep loyalty of masses. National impetus is disseminated through a set of social codes in various symbols like banknotes, coins and stamps with signs of “we/us” or “they/them” leading the grassroots-level opinions. The claim coming to the fore is that these social codes are re-introduced in a natural process absorbed within daily traditions. That is to say, nation is re-discovered through the public and banal means in a perpetual motion. Within this process, “non-flowing” flags atop public places gain dominance regarding symbolic endurance of their meanings.\textsuperscript{22} In other words, national thinking is a process, rather than a constant level, observed throughout the history of civilizations. The semiotic means of loyalty has advanced, day by day, in harmony with modernism.\textsuperscript{23}

It comes to the fore to argue that it is the way of state elites to maintain the current level of national thinking and conceptualizations of the masses, about who they are. A very scheme of conceptualization, a definite set of episteme is “indicated and flagged” in every

\textsuperscript{19} Callus, Ivan, “Theorising Europe from the Other Shore: Derrida, Community and the Exemplarity of Europe”, Stephen Herbretcher and Michael Higgins, Returning (to) Communities: Theory, Culture and Political Practice of the Communal, Rodopi, Amsterdam 2006, p.41.
\textsuperscript{21} “If, to conclude, I declared that I feel European among other things, would this be, in this very declaration, to be more or less European? Both, no doubt. Let the consequences be drawn from this. It is up to the others, in any case, and up to me among them, to decide”. Derrida, Jacques, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1992, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{22} Billig, ibid, p.10.
\textsuperscript{23} Billig’s words at this point are quite remarkable: “one might think that, people today go about their daily lives, carrying with them a piece of psychological machinery called ‘national identity’. Like a mobile telephone this piece of psychological equipment lies quiet the most of the time. Then the crisis occurs; the president calls; bells ring; the citizens answer; and the patriotic identity is connected”, ibid, p.7.
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moment of time.\textsuperscript{24} Along with the instrumental construction of notion of nation, this approach also points at temporal and non-granted social conceptualizations of being – apt to change in everyday praxis. To such extent, the claims of banal nationalism on “temporal epistemology” are in logical tune with philosophical cuts regarding co-existence and temporality of identity constructions through which conceptualizations of the “self” and “other” are in flux through the sands of time.

The article has so far underlined the use of these approaches with a claim that state-like constructions have no escape from this. The temporal dimension of co-existence between the lines of interests and norms is claimed to be manifest on the epistemology of intercommunity relations. At the same time, post-structural expressions of state and society offer a new logic to analyse the social dichotomies and conflicts with regard to social transformations in time. The identity reconstruction in Northern Cyprus throughout the rapprochement phase with the Greek Cypriot community comes to forward to reflect a remarkable case of epitomizing such a transformation within intercommunity relations. Fluctuations in national thinking of the Turkish Cypriot community are claimed to be evident considering the thirty-year period between 1974, the year of Turkey’s intervention to the island following the Greek revolt, and 2004, the era of the Annan Plan, peace and re-institutionalization schedule while the reconciliation process between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities peaked.

The rest of the article sets forth to explain this change: A wide-range of stimuli in Northern Cyprus led to a Turkish Cypriot national thinking pertinent to a conditional rapprochement along the lines of economic benefits, through novel conceptualizations. By so doing, it employs analyses reflected in the literature related to this change in national thinking of the North, which is evident in expressions of the Turkish Cypriot community during the Annan referendum. What remains in conclusion is a focus on dynamic approaches regarding temporality in national thinking, through which such dichotomic phases could be understood with changes in antithetic conceptualizations.

The Image of Greek “Other” in the Turkish Cypriot Community: A History of Alternation?

The Cyprus debate has long been a problematic issue between two guarantors, Turkey and Greece in general, and locals, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in particular. Yet the solution attempts in the island have failed due to conflict-ridden phases as well as strategic disputes. A shift in national thinking of Northern Cyprus marked with the post-2000 developments, however, has demonstrated ever-closer contacts within a potential rapprochement of two societies. The change in the course of Turkish part gained dominance rapidly, even comparing with the Southern Greek part, on the basis of the northern attitude towards the Annan referendum. At the end of the referenda simultaneously held in both sides, 64.90% of the Turkish Cypriot community implied their clear statement in favour of unification whereas the Greek side fell quite short of this standing, with 24.17%.\textsuperscript{25}

It is overemphasized above, that “self” and “other” conceptualizations of national thinking are assumed to take place on a volatile ground between extreme formations. Within the Cypriot case too, the shifts in national thinking are claimed to exist between two camps,

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, p. 6.
motherland nationalism and Cypriotism. These two concepts exert dichotomic influences by invoking Turkey-centrism in antithetic relation to the emphasis on respective emergence of Cypriotness in construction of nationhood. Would that be wrong to place the position of Rauf Denktas, the former president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in one form, the motherland nationalist part of this ground? Considering his commitment with Turkish nationalism marked in his discourse, it can be referred that President Denktas and Turkish Cypriot state reflected this view during his office. On the contrary, a novel discourse of political initiative that was effective during the 2004 negotiations discharged this view. It hence would not be wrong to assume that the rapprochement phase invoked by the Northern Cyprus is a story of fluctuations over these conceptualizations, between motherland nationalism and Cypriotism, under the influence of norms and interests of the community.

The still-existing factors stimulating this standing in the Turkish community are claimed to vary in such manner, being linked to national thinking at the grassroots and elite levels. The socio-psychological, cultural-educational and economic factors led to a society critical on unification and separatism, whereas state elites and media played a vibrant agent role in this process. Following what the constructivist approach suggests, that social norms and rational interests clash and reconcile on a mode of appropriation before any social articulation, the issue of change in national thinking of the Turkish Cypriot community has been contingent upon such a dichotomy of cultural and economic motives while social actors catalysed this process.

History showed that the initial phase of this transformation was the subject of influence within the US-Soviet debate globally, and the Turkish-Greek bipolar rivalry regionally, during the fresh years before and after the Turkish intervention. While geopolitical claims were of international interest, the national sentiments inside the Turkish community impacted by the traumatic years of 1960s and early 1970s became subject to power politics amongst the local conditions of hatred and hostilities. The pathfinders of this process remained state elites under the influence of their connections with the mainstream policy of Turkey. The point is linked to the elite-level changes, however when the political power is challenged and turned to that of liberal-integrationists, provided the outer scheme was cracked from the Cold War geopolitical rivalry to more pluralist EU platforms, the Turkish Cypriot community found a new spectrum which has been more appropriate for a shift in national thinking. A crucial incident in this regard could be the takeover of the integrationist Republican Turkish Party (CTP) in 2003, which rose with popular support and mobilization from socioeconomic discontent with

27 Yashin, Yael, Navaro, “De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus: Political and Social Conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey”, Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis and Gisela Welz (eds), Divided Cyprus, Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 2006, p.86. Denktas used a clear discourse in favor of his attachment with Turkish “motherland” that was marked in 1995 by these words: “I am a child of Anatolia. I am Turkish in every way and my roots go back to Central Asia. I am Turkish with my culture, my language, my history, and my whole being. I have a state as well as a motherland. The notions of “Cypriot culture, “Turkish Cypriot,” “Greek Cypriot,” “a shared Republic” are all nonsense.”, ibid, pp.85-86.
isolation and bureaucratic fallacies. During the manipulative propaganda process of referendum, the turning pendulum of national thinking was maintained by the CTP government in the same regard with nationalists, in an instrumental social-code spreading. The novel government covered the minimalist nature of national thinking in the Turkish Cypriot community that has gradually been the subject of conditional collocation with the Greek side rather than mainstream Anatolian mindset tracked with national myths.

Hence one side of this transformation has been the birth, rise and fade of the national trauma. The Greek “other” was accordingly conceptualized with Greek aggression and sense of insecurity. The Turkish community maintained this image during the years of conflict, adding that Turkey’s intervention in 1974 fed the impetus of constructing “self” between the lines of a “motherland” figure. The social disorder and traumatic effects in social life, marked with ethnic conflict that began in the middle of 1950s and became ever-turbulent with the dissolution of the Cypriot State in 1963, led to the Turkish Cypriot community that conceptualized Turkey more than a cognate country. When Turkey, with the “savior” image, remained the probable guarantor of their rights and safety in the national and international arena (based on the inherited rights of the London and Zurich Agreements of 1959 that settled the foundation of the Cypriot Federation), Cypriot Turks during and immediately after the crisis years felt much more attached to the Turkish motherland nationalism rather than a specific identity expression.

The organic connection with Turkey has in fact remained the greatest anchor of the pendulum between the Cypriotism and motherland nationalism. Cultural inputs of Turkism have penetrated the nationalist public discourse through the massive educational system and its intelligentsia linked to the “motherland”, as well as the media system and cultural organizations in maintenance of local language and other national tools. In general, limited “national awakening” is possible without structure; the former Ottoman Millet and later British administrative system based on autonomies in this regard deserve special references on their successive legacies over the Greek-Turkish dichotomy. The British power established a dual education system constructed on Turkish and Greek autonomies of developing respective cultural values in the end of the Ottoman age and religious segmentation of the Millet System. Furthermore, the Turkish people educated in Turkish schools could well adapt the

28 The Republican Turkish Party could seize power through a coalitionary gathering with the solution-skeptical Democratic Party, president of which was the son of Rauf Denktaş, the first and former president as well as the lead member of the former Turkish Resistance Organization to counter Greek aggression in late 1950s. Despite of this dichotomy in coalition, the CTP maintained its pro-solution standing with support of the revisionist government in Turkey. See “Türkiye ‘Evet’te Kararlı” (Turkey Decisive on ‘Yes’), Kbbrs Gazetesi, 03.04.2004, http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/2/news/7493/PageName/Ic_Haberler (15.03.2012). See also address of the Prime Minister of Turkey, “Toprak Verebiliriz” (We Can Give away Territory) Kbbrs Gazetesi, 01.02.2004, http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/2/news/4771/PageName/Ic_Haberler (18.03.2012).

29 The program of the new coalitionary government reflected its commitment with a potential unification with the Greek side, on the basis of the EU membership: “Instead of unilaterally declared EU membership of the Greek side in the name of entire Cyprus, the fundamental aim of our coalitionary government is joining the EU under unified Cypriot State, as one of equal partners maintaining our rights”, “Uzlaşma ve Çözüm Hükümeti”, (Government of Compromise and Solution), Kbbrs Gazetesi, 20.01.2004, http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/index.php/cat/2/news/4249/PageName/Ic_Haberler (18.03.2012).

30 Loizides, ibid, p. 174.

31 Loizides, ibid, p. 176.

Turkish identity as well as the republican ideological background and intellectual progress.\textsuperscript{33} In the aftermath of the British rule, the Turkish Cypriot education since the 1960s has been provided with education materials and teachers supplied and recruited from the “mother country”.\textsuperscript{34} This had an influence on identity construction over the society, by the means of elites who had particular ties and dependencies with Ankara, the connection through which the Turkish Cypriot identity was instrumentally forged on Turkey’s terms.\textsuperscript{35} As a fundamental instance, the education books before and after 2003 that is the date of integrationist CTP’s takeover reflect visible differences between official discourses of two periods. The education materials of the period between 1974 and 2003 implied a narrative along with the image of motherland with definite significations of Turkism; post-2003 books, on the other hand, are more “Cypriot-centric”, depending on social history instead of mythicized, and implying a homelands approach that entitles the Turkish and Greek communities “Turkish Cypriot” and “Greek Cypriot”, rather than the mere ethnic terms of “Turks” and “Greeks”.\textsuperscript{36} Considering the instrumental nature of nation-building the banal nationalism dwells upon, those books with their norm-spreading characteristics could have a say over the characterization of national thinking in the Turkish Cypriot society.

The Turkish Cypriot society has so far projected this social change. Besides the gradual construction of the Northern Cypriot state autonomy, social norms in the community have remained apt to change between motherland national thinking and Cypriotism, while further generations of the war-impacted population have become more distant to traumas. In the age of limited interaction with the outer world due to political-economic sanctions, various channels such as universities in Northern Cyprus quickened the matter of questioning such conceptualizations.\textsuperscript{37} It is thus justified to claim that economic factors and the issue of isolation mentioned below have found greater importance in this debate.


\textsuperscript{36} Papadakis, Yiannis, “Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Schoolbooks on the ‘History of Cyprus’”, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 2008, pp.14-25.

\textsuperscript{37} Since the foundation of the new republic in 1983, introducing Cyprus to the international arena did not become much likely in diplomacy but second track relations such as education or tourism. Meanwhile, operating Turkish Cypriot universities involved in interactions with western partners contributed to the idea of “change” among the Turkish Cypriot youth. During the discussion of the plan, a youth movement of 22,000 students from six universities of the Turkish Cypriot Community was in demonstration for the solution. Pericleous, Chrysostomos, The Cyprus Referendum: The Divided Island and the Challenge of the Annan Plan, I.B.Tauris, London and New York 2009, p. 167. Youth-led bigger protests of up to one third of the Turks on the island were held with the emphasis on “Solution and the EU membership”, see “Protesting Turkish Cypriots Urge Reunification”, The Guardian, 14.01.2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jan/14/cyprus.eu (18.02.2012).
This debate has grown gradually. Though the constitutional referendum overshadowed by Turkey resulted with approval in 1985, the end of the 1980s witnessed a vibrant challenge from Turkish civil society and political parties in opposition, which questioned “unconditional” dependence with Ankara as well as the deteriorating economy and situation of Turkish immigrants.\(^{38}\) Therefore the early 1980s remained an era of unquestioned allegiance, whereas further years led to new political identities in support of rapprochement with the Greek side. The talks with the Greek counterparts during the 1990s contributed to an alternate political attitude.

The immigrants from Turkey since 1974 have not been an issue for the southern part only, but for the North too. These people of more than 115,000 departed from Turkey to Northern Cyprus and impacted the composition of the island.\(^{39}\) This resulted in a mass of Turkish Cypriot settlers in the region that questioned the share of “Turks of Turkey” more than ever, having considered the economic problems and unemployment.\(^{40}\) This turmoil eventuated in outmigration of Turkish Cypriots to western and commonwealth countries, especially Britain.\(^{41}\)

It was the age of economic relapse, thus, while the Turkish Cypriot community reacted. The Turkish society, especially younger generation questioning the isolation found an “inner other” in the region. Massive existence of Turkish troops on the island along with systemic settling of Turkish immigrants by Turkey had critical counterparts mostly in media, such as the columnist Kutlu Adalı, the investigative journalist in “Yeni Düzen” before he was assassinated.\(^{42}\) The media thus became an effective agent of facilitation for the re-articulation of the national identity. The term “Cypriot-Turk”, for example, instead of “Turk” was granted by Sevgül Uludağ, journalist and opposition member.\(^{43}\)

Within those circumstances marked by increasing discontent in the economic backwardness and ill-governance, the political opposition through the 2004 Annan referenda dominated the national thinking with promise of a potential solution in Cypriot debate and set forth a novel conceptualization of “self” with a larger reference to Cypriotness and escaping international isolationism.\(^{44}\) The Annan Plan and reactionary popular move during the

\(^{38}\) Loizides, ibid, p.177.


\(^{41}\) The policy of Turkish Cypriot state that was encapsulated by words of Denktas, “One Turk leaves and another arrives”, however, remained indifferent to the case. Yashin, ibid, p.94.


\(^{43}\) Loizides, ibid, p. 180. Uludağ has been known with her thoughts against motherland nationalism: “I am going to vote YES in order to destroy the ‘sin’ of ‘nationalism’ that only brought bloodshed and tears to my country, as Neophytos says… ‘Nationalism’ is a disease – it is painting ‘masks of the devil’ on each other’s faces and then being afraid of these masks, as my friend Nicos says… I will vote YES in order to remove those ‘masks’ and bring ‘humanity’ to this island…”, Uludağ, Sevgi, “YES for the Ending of an Expired Conflict…”, Alithia, 11.04.2004, http://www.stwing.upenn.edu/~durduran/support/svgblossom/?_start=202 (12.02.2012).

referendum in the North remained an important indicator of this change to the extent in which
the bi-zonal Plan with high respect to territorial autonomies matched geography-oriented
national thinking of the Turkish Cypriot community and relevant expectations that were
conditional with collocation with the Greek side.45 Second, the motivation of the EU as a
source of “welfare” provided greatest stimulus in Turkish Cypriots’ identity change.46 The
growing expectations for welfare in the community and rising level of complaints on
economic matters and integration with global markets promised with the Cyprus-EU
unification showed the economic vision of instrumental change. This image was pictured not
only by the electoral behavior of the masses. A great number of the Turkish Cypriots applied
for the Greek-issued passports before the EU membership of the South symbolized a
“practical” reasoning of Greek-Turkish cohabitation.47

In summary, the composition of the national identification in the Turkish Cypriot
community altered in time, towards the Annan plan, with a bigger emphasis on Cypriotism.
This change could well be traced back to the December 2003 parliamentary elections. The
nationalist Ulusal Birlik Partisi (National Unity Party) and Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)
lost 10% of their votes, compared with their 1998 electoral success; whereas the revisionist-
integrationist Republican Turkish Party boosted its votes by 163%.48 This shift in the social
ground of political expression led to further idealism with 65% approval in the 2004
Referendum held for unification with the Greek side.49

Various public pools in the aftermath of referenda sketched the intervening factors for
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot electoral behaviors. In one experiment, the Turkish respondents
were asked questions to reveal the reasons behind their positive votes; the composition of the
“yes” votes was dominated by impetus of the EU perspective. Accordingly, the 69% of
the Turkish Cypriot population found the Annan Plan and related referendum the last step before
EU membership.50 This was rational interest, an indirect factor behind the “yes” votes. In

while attachment with Turkicness is 23%, and 53% is reserved for equal level of attachment between these two
values (data elaborated from the work entitled “Bridging the Gap in the Inter-communal Negotiations: An Island-
negotiations-english (05.02.2012).
45 Vural, Yucel and Nikos Peristianis, “Beyond Ethno-Nationalism: Emerging Trends in Cypriot Politics After
46 Lacher, Hannes and Erol Kaymak, “Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non-Settlement in North
Cyprus” Mediterranean Politics, vol. 10, no.2, 2005, p.148. The novel Turkish generation had this motivation
provided with a potential EU citizenship during the pre-referenda process. Parties dealing with this issue
intensively reflected the “European essence” of the Turkish Cypriot future. For instance, an active political camp
of the relevant context emerged with a promising name: “Çözüm ve AB Partisi”, the Solution and EU Party.
47 Baruh, Lemi and Mihaela, Popescu, “Guiding Metaphors of Nationalism: the Cyprus Issue and the
Construction of Turkish National Identity in Online Discussions”, Discourse & Communication, vol. 2, 2008,
p.80.
48 “Sandıktan Çözüm ve AB Çıktı, Meclis Kilitlendi” (‘EU and Solution’ from Polls, Parliament Deadlocked)
(15.02.2012).
49 During the Annan Referendum, there was linkage between “yes” and “no” votes, and being CTP or UBP
supporter, Lordos, Alexandros, “Rational Agent or Unthinking Follower? A Survey-based Profile Analysis of
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Referendum Voters”, http://www.cypruspolls.org/RationalOrUnthinking.pdf
(10.02.2012).
50 Ibid.
parallel, “low family income” respondents were likely to accept the plan (67%), while all other conditions were regarded equal. In the light of the questionnaire, what remained was a set of stimuli in the sense of rational choice before the Turkish Cypriot social expression during the referendum in the North.

At the same time, the public poll showed that general norms played a lowering role before “yes” votes. For the questions measuring the advisability of “high-level community with Greeks” and “a possible marriage with a Greek”, 48% and 42% of respondents respectively approved so, while they in a sense projected that the economic opportunities of potential unification exceeded the norms.\textsuperscript{51} Another public poll undertaken in cooperation with the KADEM Cyprus Social Research questioned the respondents’ further expectations and demonstrated similar results\textsuperscript{52}. 44% of entire voters in the Northern Cyprus favored “economic development”, while 67% of this group voted “yes”. In contrast, the norm-led decisions were separate in that 34% of the voters sided with “a pure Turkish state” with a rigid consideration of the Greek “other” while 40% of them voted “yes” after all, and finally the 23% of the Turkish Cypriot voters followed an ideal of unconditional integration with no or less conceptualization of the Greek “other” while 90% of them voted “yes” in the referendum.

Keeping the respective notion that there is no crystal clear separation between norms and interests, the sum of public polls leads the reader to epitomize that the foregrounding factors of electoral behavior within the Turkish community, as far as the polls convey, mostly seem interest-led behaviors. Depending on an appropriate mode between norms and interests, to elaborate the case on a theoretical ground, it is noteworthy that the majority of the Turkish Cypriot community during the Annan referendum acted in accordance with potential welfare, rather than social customs on inter-group dichotomy. This outcome renders the case of theoretical importance, considering the temporality of national thinking apart from frozen identities.

Existing scholarly works and data of this case point at limited results. Depending on maximum relevancy with the existing literature, the first is that national thinking in the Turkish Cypriot community is claimed to take form among variety of norms and interests. The traditional Turkish autonomy constructed in the Ottoman Millet System and further British administration, inter-group cleavages, conflicts and related trauma on one hand, motivations of mostly EU-led enrichment and reactions against the ill-governance and economic isolationism on the other have provided the limits of the new national thinking in the Turkish Cypriot community. Second, the dominant ideology of motherland nationalism felt during conflictual years has been relatively replaced with national thinking formed with a reference to Cypriotism or Turkism Cypriotism. The intertwined conceptualizations of “self” and especially Greek “other” are subjects of further inquiry however. The claim is either way maintained by various studies that there is a shift in national identity of the Turkish Cypriot Community, through more minimalist conceptualizations. The change is explained by various factors including welfare, the EU perspectives and dissolution from the mainstream Turkic ideology. Understanding such a social topology is claimed to seem less formidable through a political theory. The study so far resorted to lead arguments of the existentialist debate on temporality

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
of being social phenomenon, as well as a similar logic offered in social anthropology entitled banal nationalism.

**Concluding Remarks**

The study is confined to be a view over identity studies reflecting temporal essence of national thinking and related conceptualizations. Related logics put forward in the existentialist philosophy, like that of Heidegger and corresponding debates over the temporality and coexistence of being and temporal-instrumental construction of nationalism highlighted within the premises of social anthropology are, in this sense, stimulating.

It then opts to point at the changing societal articulation in the Turkish Cypriot community as far as it has been reflected in relevant literature. Via the logic of temporality employed in identity studies shown above, Turkish Cypriot national thinking is claimed to be altering in time, within the period between 1974 and 2004, towards less excluding idioms. The changing conditions of national thinking in Northern Cyprus lead the author to rely on revealing arguments of political theory that heed the temporal character of self-other conceptualizations. The change in the Turkish Cypriot national thinking through stimuli of welfare perspectives expressed during the referendum of unification is worth reflecting upon, considering the margins of temporality constructed by reasoning over norms and interests. Yet the changing circumstances in the aftermath of the referendum should be taken into consideration in further studies reflecting these margins of national thinking. Besides, this paper concerns itself with the temporal and instrumental essence of national thinking and self-other conceptualizations that are central of identity studies, to understand cases like the Turkish Cypriot attitude in the referendum process of the Annan unification plan.
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